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Abstract
This work explores the dynamics of the ‘virtuous circle’ driving the impressive Chinese catching-up
and growth by investigating the micro relationships linking productivity, profitability, investment
and growth, based on China’s manufacturing firm-level dataset over the period 1998 - 2007. Inter-
estingly and somewhat puzzlingly, we find that productivity variations, rather than relative levels,
are the prevalent productivity-related determinant of firm growth. Moreover, the direct relation
between profitability and firm growth is much weaker and its contribution to the explanation of the
different rates of firm growth is almost negligible. The only visible profitability-growth relationship
is mediated via investment. Firm’s contemporaneous and lagged profitabilities display positive and
significant effect on the probability to report an investment spike, and, in turn, investment activities
are related to higher firm growth.
Keywords: Productivity, learning, profitability, virtuous circle, catching-up, Chinese industry
JEL: D22, L10, L20, L60, O30
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 050883343; fax: +39 050883344.
Email addresses: x.yu@santannapisa.it (Xiaodan Yu), giovanni.dosi@santannapisa.it (Giovanni Dosi),
marco.grazzi@unibo.it (Marco Grazzi), leijs@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn (Jiasu Lei)
Preprint submitted to Research Policy March 15, 2017
1. Introduction
The last three decades witnessed an impressive growth of the Chinese economy. Indeed, China
undertook a deep and fast great transformation - borrowing Karl Polanyi (1944) expression - leading
from a traditional mostly rural economy to an economy driven by industrial activities. China’s real
per capita GDP has grown from only one-fortieth of the U.S. level and one-tenth the Brazilian
level in 1978 to almost one-fifth the U.S. level and at the same level as Brazil by 2012 (Zhu, 2012).
What has driven such a striking performance?
Grounded on a growth accounting decomposition framework, Zhu (2012) concludes that China’s
rapid growth over the last three decades has been mainly driven by total factor productivity (TFP)
growth rather than by capital investment.1 However, in our view, decomposition effects are likely to
only scratch the surface of a phenomenon characterized by widespread complementarities, processes
of circular causation and cumulative dynamics (Myrdal, 1957):
All [...] frustrating effects of poverty, operating through other media than those analyzed by
traditional economic theory, are interlocked in circular causation, the one with the others and
all with the biases I referred to in the working of migration, capital movements and trade. The
opposite effects of rising economic levels in the centres of expansion are in a similar fashion also
inter-connected in a circular causation, continuously sustaining further expansion in a cumulative
fashion. [...] if the expansionary momentum is strong enough to overcome the backwash effects
from the older centres, new centres of self-sustained economic expansion [develop] (Myrdal, 1957,
pp.30-31).
In a circular causation framework increasing returns are widespread (Myrdal, 1957; Kaldor,
1972; Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz, 2009). In fact, the patterns of accumulation of knowledge and
capabilities, at the levels of individuals, organizations and countries are at the core of increasing
returns. The ‘unbound Prometheus’ systematically accumulating and improving technological and
organizational knowledge is a crucial deus ex machina of the early industrialization of almost three
centuries ago, and as well as of subsequent episodes of development (Landes, 1969; Freeman and
Soete, 1997). The rapid economic catch-up and industrialization in China is no exception, in that it
entails more of learning and “creative restructuring” of domestic firms rather than sheer “creative
1In such estimates, the growth contributions made by human capital accumulation and increase in labour partic-
ipation, the other two sources of growth in growth accounting decomposition, are positive but modest (Zhu, 2012).
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destruction” and even less so a multinational corporation-led drive (Yu et al., 2015). The rapid
catching-up since 1978 is characterized by mobilizing the capabilities in part accumulated in the
pre-liberalized stage and the high rates of investment after launching the economic reform which
incorporates both the employment of modern machineries, organizational restructuring and learn-
ing. Chinese industrialization has certainly involved catching-up of all sectors by means of big and
coordinated investment and capital accumulation, in the spirit of what suggested by the founding
fathers of development economics (Nurkse (1953), Gerschenkron (1962), Rosenstein-Rodan (1943,
1961), Hirschman (1958), Prebisch (1949)). However, more importantly, the catching-up has been
associated with learning effects well beyond the sheer accumulation of capital, involving the im-
provement of technological and organizational capabilities and the more efficient use of both capital
and labour (Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz, 2009; Lee, 2013). This is not at all unique to China: see Lee
(2013) for the interpretation of catching-up in Korea - basically a story of capability accumulation
at the firm-level, involving also a considerable degree of State activism.
In this work, we explore the microeconomic evidence on China’s industrialization, the “virtuous
circle” linking highly heterogeneous firm-level productivities, profitabilities, investments and corpo-
rate growth, both driven by and leading to firm-level technological and organizational learning and
capability accumulation. Such virtuous circle is sketched in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The virtuous circle.
Note that the accumulation of production knowledge and process innovation underlying the
impressive Chinese catching-up in productivity is only one, albeit crucial element of the whole
virtuous circle driving the great transformation. Another major one is the influence exerted by
the huge productivity differentials across firms upon corporate growth (and mortality) - i.e., the
selection effect. In particular here, we focus on the effects of productivities, both in levels and
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growth rates, upon the patterns of firm growth in Chinese manufacturing over the 1998-2007 period.
Moreover, we consider the possibility that effect of productivity upon firm growth is not exerted
directly, but is mediated via profitability and investment in tangible assets. Together, we also
investigate the role played by different governance and ownership structures.
We find that relative productivity growth rather than relative levels are the prevalent productivity-
related determinants of firm growth. Conversely, the direct relation between profitability and firm
growth is much weaker and its contribution to the explanation of the different rates of firm growth
is almost negligible. Rather, the only detectable profitability-growth relationship appears to be
mediated via investment. Contemporaneous and lagged profitabilities display positive and sig-
nificant effect on the probability of displaying a large investment episode. We also find that such
effect varies significantly across firm’s ownership types: Chinese domestic private-owned enterprises
(POEs) appear to be more financially constrained than State-owned enterprises (SOEs). In turn,
firms’ investment activities are related to better performances, and such effect is more significant
for State-owned enterprises than other types of firms.
In section 2, we offer a telegraphic outline of our theoretical and empirical points of departures.
Section 3 describes data and variables. Section 4 discusses the relationship between relative produc-
tivities and corporate growth. Section 5 considers the influence of profitabilities upon investments
and section 6 shows the impact of the latter on firm growth. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical and empirical roots
2.1. Vicious and virtuous circles
Myrdal (1957) suggests that the principle of interlocking, circular inter-dependence within a
process of cumulative causation - nowadays we would say dynamic increasing returns - should be
the paradigm when studying the development process. The circular causation process can work
either in a “vicious” or a “virtuous” fashion, which can be influenced by the exogenous changes out
of the local system. Myrdal (1957) gives a simple example of the “virtuous circle” (often discussing
“vicious circles”), addressing its spatially local dimension:
The cumulative process, [...] , also works if the initial change is for the better. The
decision to locate an industry in a particular community, for instance, gives a spur to
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its general development. Opportunities of employment and higher incomes are provided
for those unemployed before or employed in a less remunerative way. Local business
can flourish as the demand for their products and services increases. Labour, capital
and enterprise are attracted from outside to exploit the expanding opportunities. The
establishment of a new business or the enlargement of an old one widens the market for
others, as does generally the increase of incomes and demand, [...] and the expansion
process creates external economies favourable for sustaining its continuation. (Myrdal,
1957, pp.25)
Note that in such a circular causation framework, there are conflicting forces driving either
toward divergence or convergence among regions or countries. Market forces normally tend to
increase, rather than to decrease, the inequalities among regions/countries. Conversely, the “ex-
pansionary momentum”, the development remedies - coordinated investmentS on a large scale of
complementary industries - as the founding figures of development economics suggested involve
“[an] industrializaton processes [which begin] only if the industrializaton movement can proceed
along a broad front, starting simultaneously along many lines of economic activities. This is partly
the existence of complementarity of indivisibilities in economic processes. [...] Fruits of industrial
progress in certain lines are received as external economies by other branches of industry whose
progress in turn accords benefits to the former” (Gerschenkron, 1962).
In all that, increasing returns in manufacturing play a special role. As Kaldor (1972) argues,
first, plant cost per unit of output decrease with size in any integrated process of operation; second,
scale fosters division of labour and together automation of production; third, learning-by-doing
effects, “the annual gain of productivity due to ‘embodied technical progress’ will tend to be all
the greater the larger the number of plants constructed per year.” (Kaldor, 1972, pp. 1243)
Moreover, in line with, but well beyond the large-scale coordinated investment stimulus and the
sheer accumulation of capital, the great transformation - industrialization - involves processes able
to systematically learn how to implement and eventually generate new ways of producing and new
products under conditions of dynamic increasing returns (Cimoli, Dosi, and Stiglitz, 2009). Such a
‘great transformation’ entails a major process of accumulation of knowledge and capabilities, both at
the levels of individuals and organizations. Certainly, part of such capabilities builds on education
and formally acquired skills. However, at least important, capabilities have to do with the problem-
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solving knowledge embodied in organizations - concerning e.g. production technologies, marketing,
labour relations as well as ‘dynamic capabilities’ of search and learning. (pp 2.)
Together, the dynamics of industrialization rests upon major structural transformations which
entail a changing importance of different branches of economic activity as generators of both techno-
logical and organizational innovators. In each epoch there appears to be technologies whose domains
of application are so wide and their role so crucial that the pattern of technical change of each coun-
try depends to a large extent on the national capabilities in mastering production/imitation/innovation
in such crucial knowledge areas (e.g. in the past, mechanical engineering, electricity and electri-
cal devices, and nowadays also information technologies). Moreover, the linkages among pro-
duction activities often embody structured hierarchies whereby the most dynamic technological
paradigms play a fundamental role as sources of technological skills, problem-solving opportunities,
and productivity improvements. Thus, these core technologies shape the overall absolute advan-
tages/disadvantages of each country. Moreover, the patterns of technical change of each country in
these core technologies are complementary to the technological capabilities in other activities.
This basic story finds an increasing support by learning-/capability - centered reconstructions
of the development processes: see Freeman (1987); Lee and Kim (2009) and Cimoli, Dosi, and
Stiglitz (2009) among many others cited there.
The analysis of the microeconomics of such processes, however, is still far lagging behind. The
work which follows is meant also as a contribution to filling such a gap.
2.2. The microeconomics
Consider first the micro relation between productivity and growth.
There are two channels through which productivity may fuel firm growth. A first, direct, channel
is that whereby more efficient firms gain market shares and grow more than competitors by setting
lower prices. If competitiveness is inversely related to prices, and in turn prices are inversely
related to productivity, the law of motion of a replicator-type dynamic of shares of firms in any one
industry is such that firms with above-average productivity should display above-average growth
and increase their market shares, and vice versa for less productive firms.2 A second, indirect,
2In this first approximation we do not mean to address the (hard) disentangling between physical productivity,
and value added at constant prices, and neither the issue which are the proper indexes to deflate output and value
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channel is that whereby more efficient firms operating in a competitive, price-taking market ought
to enjoy higher profits and hence would invest more, especially in presence of imperfect capital
markets, and consequently gain market shares at the expenses of competitors (Nelson and Winter,
1982; Bottazzi et al., 2001).
On the empirical side our point of departure is the impressive heterogeneity that one observes
across firms in all measures of efficiency irrespectively of the levels of disaggregation, the time
window of observation and the country considered. This applies to developed countries (see, among
others, Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Dosi, 2007; Syverson, 2011), and even more so to emerging
economies: we document and analyze the phenomenon in detail in the case of China in Yu et al.
(2015). It is plausible to expect that such persistent heterogeneity ought to have some systematic,
direct or indirect, effect upon corporate performances and in particular corporate growth.
The evidence on the ways higher relative efficiencies directly translates into higher firm growth
is somewhat puzzling. Bottazzi et al. (2010) report that productivity levels of the firms have
surprisingly low power in explaining the variance of firms’ growth rates. On the contrary, the
latter are mostly accounted for by time invariant unobserved variables (“fixed effects”), ultimately
capturing also idiosyncratic degrees of “strategic freedom” of individual firms.3 Another procedure,
aiming at extracting out of unobserved fixed effects the part which correlates with within-firm
average productivities, is proposed in Dosi et al. (2015). This is the analytical route that we shall
also follow here. Dosi et al. (2015) show a higher explanatory power (20%) of relative productivities
for differential firm growth as compared to 5% explanatory power in Bottazzi et al. (2010).
Come as it may, there are also indirect channels through which higher efficiency might contribute
to firm growth. One of them is mediated via profitabilities. The effect of selection via profitabilities
(and differential investment rates) has been much less studied. Among the few works, Coad (2007)
does not find any robust association between profitabilities and subsequent growth.
added (cf. Foster et al., 2008).
3Behind such a finding there are also technical reasons: it tends to happen when the explanatory variable, pro-
ductivity levels in this case, is rather invariant over time and is collinear with the firm fixed effect (see Section 2.1 in
Arellano, 2003). Hence resorting to plain fixed effects models washes away the contribution of the average efficiency
of a firm over the observed period, which result in a systematic underestimation of the “true” contribution of the
relative efficiency variable to relative firm growth.
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If higher efficiency translates into higher profitability and, other things being equal, into higher
cash-flows, then under massive capital market imperfections as it is the rule everywhere, more
internal financial resources untie financial constraints and hence allow the acquisition of more
new-vintage investments, which might foster firm growth. Note that if investments are a crucial
mediating variable, their analysis is particularly tricky, due to the lumpy nature of investment ac-
tivities at firm-level (cf. the seminal Doms and Dunne (1998) and the following stream of studies):
years of inactivity or repair and maintenance are followed by one or several years of heavy invest-
ment, displaying some but limited synchronization with the industry business cycle (cf. Carpenter
et al. (1998); Fagiolo and Luzzi (2006); Brown et al. (2009)).
Rather intuitively, large investment projects require correspondingly conspicuous financial re-
sources. If those available internally are insufficient, the firm will have to rely on external finance to
realize the project and this might lead to two consequences. First, the acquisition of new equipment
and capital stock will be constrained, that is, the firm’s desired level of investment will be curbed
because of limited access to external finance (cf. Fazzari et al., 1988; Schiantarelli, 1996; Audretsch
and Elston, 2002; Whited, 2006). Second, to the extent that investment is associated to firm
growth, the existence of financial constraints will preclude the possibility to exploit opportunities
for growth even when they notionally exist. Thus, limited access to external finance will constraint
firm growth (see, among the others Oliveira and Fortunato, 2006; Whited, 2006). Notice in this
respect that “imperfections” of the financial system tend to be more pronounced in an emerging
economies such as China (see among the others Cull and Xu, 2003; Allen et al., 2012; Chen and
Guariglia, 2013). In the following we shall investigate the relevance of financial constraints (as
proxied by limited internal financing) among Chinese firms, conditional on the different ownership
structures. Indeed, incumbent evidence shows that they matter (Guariglia et al., 2011) especially
in terms of constraints for the growth to private firms.
In accordance with most of the literature on capital adjustment patterns, we study both the
effects of firm-level characteristics on the likelihood to display an investment spike as well the
impact of spikes on firm performance resorting to a framework which is standard in the literature
on capital adjustment, see among the others, Sakellaris (2004), Licandro et al. (2003), Nilsen et al.
(2009), Grazzi et al. (forthcoming) and Asphjell et al. (2014). In particular, following an investment
spike one expects to observe a productivity increase, which in turn translates into market share
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gains, thus sales and employment growth. The empirical literature on the subject (Power, 1998;
Huggett and Ospina, 2001; Sakellaris, 2004; Shima et al., 2010) has only partially confirmed these
theoretical conjectures. While the effect of investment spikes on productivity growth seems often
to be negative in the short run (probably due to the inefficiencies associated with production re-
organization), studies evaluating long-run impacts often fail to detect a positive relation between
investment lumps and productivity growth. The evidences on investment activity of Chinese firms
is very limited.4 What we know (see Lee (2016)), is that i) private enterprises have a higher
propensity to invest than firms of other ownership types, and such investment patterns may be
behind the higher labour productivity growth as compared to foreign-invested and State-owned
enterprises; ii) in the most recent period (2005-09) the effect of investment upon productivity is
positively scaled-biased among private firms, and also in State-owned ones. By contrast, foreign-
invested enterprises displayed only a modest investment activity and a relatively stagnant labour
productivity.
Of course below we shall also focus again on the investment-productivity nexus as it is a crucial
element of the virtuous circle discussed above.
3. Data and Variables
This work draws upon firm level data collected by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS). The database includes all industrial firms with sales above 5 million RMB covering period
1998-2007 and has already been employed in other empirical investigations, among others, Hu et al.
(2005); Fu and Gong (2011); Yu et al. (2015).5 Each firm is assigned to a sector according to the
4-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) system that closely matches the Standard Industrial
4Chen et al. (2011), based on a Tobin’s Q framework, show that the sensitivity of investment expenditures to
investment opportunity is significantly weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs, suggesting less investment efficiency in
SOEs. Dollar and Wei (2007), measuring investment efficiency in terms of return to capital, shows that SOEs have
significantly lower returns to capital than domestic private or foreign-invested firms.
5Industry is defined to include mining, manufacturing and public utilities, according to National Bureau of Statis-
tics of China (NBSC). Five million RMB is approximately $US 600,000. The total output and value added are not
available in 2004, thus, we do not use data for that year.
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Classification (SIC) employed by the U.S. Bureau of Census.6 Out of the comprehensive set of
all firms, we focus on manufacturing firms only. We then apply a few cleaning procedures to the
resulting set of data in order to eliminate visible recording errors (see Table A.1). We will refer to
the final version of the database as “China Micro Manufacturing” (CMM).7
We are interested in corporate performances as revealed by several major dimensions, namely,
productivity, profitability, investment rate and firm growth. Productivity Πi,t is the ratio of value
added, at constant prices, over the number of employees, Πi,t =
V Ai,t
Ni,t
, where V Ai,t is real value
added,8 Ni,t is the number of employees, of firm i at year t.
9 Labour costs COLi,t are defined
as the sum of total wages and social security contributions. Our proxy for profitability are the
gross profit margins, that is the ratio between gross profits and output: Pi,t =
V Ai,t−COLi,t
Outputi,t
.10
Firm growth is measured as the log difference of (constant price) sales in two consecutive years:
6In 2003, the classification system was revised. Some sectors were further disaggregated, while others were merged
together. To make the industry codes comparable over time, we adopted the harmonized classification proposed in
Brandt et al. (2012).
7We applied the following cleaning procedure. We dropped firms with missing, zero or negative output, value-
added, sales, original value of fixed assets, cost of labour; and also firms with a number of employees less than 8,
since below that threshold they operate under another legal system (Brandt et al., 2012). Finally, note that NBSC
modified the industrial classification after 2002. In this paper we employ the industrial classification in use before
2003. Since sector “recycling of waste and scrap” was emerged during the observation period, we do not consider it
here.
8According to the definition of NBSC, value added = gross output - intermediate input + value added tax. Gross
industrial output value: “the total volume of final industrial products produced and industrial services provided
during a given period. It reflects the total achievements and overall scale of industrial production during a given
period” (China Statistical Yearbook, 2007).
9Value-added is deflated by four-digit sectoral output deflators, from Brandt et al. (2012).
10We use output as the denominator instead of sales in order to be consistent with the NBSC methodology of
computing value added, which is the difference between output and intermediate inputs. Also notice that the two
variables, output and sales, are highly correlated, with a 0.99 correlation coefficient. We have chosen gross profit
margins as a measure of profitability, first, because it is less subject to accounting manipulation, a practice quite
widespread in China (Cai and Liu, 2009) as elsewhere. Second, it broadly corresponds to the MBITDA (margins
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) quite used in the management literature. Third, it is a rather close
proxy for cash flows, as such a variable which is likely to influence investments. Prompted by a referee, however, we
tried other (net) measures of profitability. The results of the exercises shown is Section 5, however do not qualitatively
change (the elaborations are available on request).
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Gi,t = logSalesi,t − logSalesi,t−1. Firm’s investment rate at time t is defined as the ratio of
investment at time t and capital stock at time t − 1. Investment is not directly reported in the
data. Thus, we compute investment at time t as the difference of firm’s fixed assets between time t
and t− 1.11 The series of “real” capital stock are then computed following the perpetual inventory
method, with the rate of depreciation 9% (as in Brandt et al., 2012). Table A.2 reports statistics
of the mean values of the variables of interest.
We identify seven categories of firms according to their ownership and governance structures.
They are State-owned enterprises (SOEs); collective-owned enterprises (COEs), Hong Kong, Macao
and Taiwan-invested enterprises (HMTs); foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), including foreign
MNCs (FMNC) and joint ventures (JV) with a foreign share above 25%; shareholding enterprises
(SHEs), that is State-private Chinese joint ventures; private-owned enterprises (POEs); and other
domestic enterprises (ODEs). As reported in Table A.3, the original 23 registration categories have
been aggregated in line with Jefferson et al. (2003).
4. Relative productivities and firm growth
Let us start by looking at the relationship between firm productivities and growth rates by means
of a simple bivariate kernel regression. Figure 2 reports the productivity-growth relationship for
three rather typical 3-digit sectors. The plots highlight the existence of a positive but mild relation
between contemporaneous (relative) productivities and relative growth rates, well in line to what
shown in Bottazzi et al. (2010).
In order to allow for a richer structure in the productivity-growth relationship, we employ a
distributed lag (log) linear model with fixed effect (Bottazzi et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 2015).12 Based
on sequential rejection of the statistical significance of longer lags structure, we choose as our
baseline equation a model with one lag for productivity:
gi,t = α+ β0pii,t + β1pii,t−1 + γ1SIZEi,t−1 + γ2AGEi,t−1 + bt + ui + i,t (1)
11According to NBSC, fixed assets include equipment and buildings.
12Lagged values are required for the strict exogeneity of the error term imposed for consistency of standard panel
estimators.
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Figure 2: Productivity - Growth relationship in selected 3-digit sectors (textile clothing, automobiles and communi-
cation equipment) - kernel regression of 2003. Source: our elaboration on CMM. Note: the first row shows current
relationship and the second row shows lagged relationship.
where gi,t denotes the growth rate of firm i in terms of log-differences of sales between two
consecutive years, pii,t is the (log) labour productivity, bt is a time dummy, ui is a firm-specific
time invariant unobserved effect, and i,t is the error term.
13 We also include firm size (proxied by
number of employees) and age as additional controls (SIZEi,t−1 and AGEi,t−1).14
Equation 1 is estimated for each of the available 3 digit sectors and the distribution of parameters
β0, β1 and β0 + β1 is shown in Figure 3.
15 The absolute values of the two coefficients are quite
stable across sectors with median 0.2. Note also that β0 and β1 are of opposite sign and of similar
magnitude. This was shown, on a different set of data, also in Dosi et al. (2015) and can be
interpreted as revealing a sort of regression to the mean.
13Note that the presence of time dummies is equivalent to consider the variables in deviation from their cross-
sectional average, so that what matters is only the relative efficiency of firms in the industry.
14We thank one of the referee for the suggesting to include these further controls.
15The “violin” shaped plot reports a box plot and a kernel density distribution to each side of the box plot. The
box plot reports the median values and interquartile ranges. The table with the point estimates for all 3 digit sectors
is available upon request.
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Figure 3: Productivity - Growth relationship at 3-digit sectoral level. Distribution of parameters β0, β1 and β0 + β1
of the baseline model, based on 3 digit sectors estimates.
Despite the statistical significance, the coefficient estimates are not very informative on the
extent to which firms are “selected”, that is, how their market shares vary according to their relative
productivities. To assess the strength of competitive selection, one needs to resort to a coefficient of
determination to assess the proportion of the variance of firm growth explained by current and past
relative productivities. Bottazzi et al. (2010) report in the case of Italy and France that the current
relative productivity appears to “explain” roughly between 3% and 5% of the overall variance in
growth, while the contribution of firm’s unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics is much larger. In
order to tell apart the effects due to average productivity levels from “genuine” firm fixed-effects
we disentangle within the unobserved effect ui, the part which correlates with productivity from
the part which does not (see also Dosi et al., 2015). It is then possible to re-estimate Equation (1)
through a Correlated Random Effects model:
gi,t = α+ β0pii,t + β1pii,t−1 + β0ap¯ii + β1ap¯ii,−1 + γ1SIZEi,t−1 + γ2AGEi,t−1 + bt + µi + i,t (2)
where p¯ii and p¯ii,−1 are the within-firm time series averages of the (log) productivity up to time
t and time t − 1, respectively, while µi is the new unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity term,
13
uncorrelated with the productivity regressors after controlling for their averages. The advantage
with respect to Equation (1) is that we are explicitly taking into account the contribution to sales
growth also of productivity averages over time. The random effects estimates from Equation (2)
hardly change the value of the coefficients β0 and β1.
16
However, our main interest lies in a measure of the fraction of total variance of firm growth
explained by productivity terms, and we compute it as follows
S2 =
V ar(β0pii,t + β1pii,t−1 + β0ap¯ii + β1ap¯ii,−1)
V ar(gi,t)
. (3)
while the conventional coefficient of determination of the overall fit of the model
R2 =
V ar(β0pii,t + β1pii,t−1 + β0ap¯ii + β1ap¯ii,−1) + V ar(γ1SIZEi,t−1 + γ2AGEi,t−1 + µi)
V ar(gi,t)
(4)
takes into account the contribution of the heterogeneity term µi and other control variables,
so that the difference between R2 and S2 delivers a measure of the variance explained by time
invariant firm’s unobserved effects and additional control variables.
Figure 4 reports the distributions of the values of R2 and S2 together with S2∆ and S
2
a (i.e.,
the decomposition of S2: S2∆ represents the part of S
2 due to productivity variation; S2a represents
the part of S2 due to average productivity level) based on 3-digit sectors estimates. Our model
with levels and averages of productivity plus firm-level heterogeneity is able to account for around
47% - 59% of the variance in sales growth. The median of the R2s is 52.81%. The median value
of S2, capturing only the contribution of the productivity regressors (both levels and averages), is
14.36%. That is, productivity variables appear to account for around one sixth of the variance in
firms’ growth rates. The explanatory power of productivity variables, hint at an important even if
not overwhelming role of efficiency-driven competitive selection.17
The last four columns of Table 1 also show, for sake of robustness, the corresponding measures
based on total factor productivity (TFP) at 3- and 4- digit respectively, (however, see the caveats
16Results are available upon requests.
17To provide robustness check, this property also holds at more disaggregated level, 4-digit sectoral level. Mean
and median statistics are reported in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Productivity - Growth relationship at 3-digit sectoral level. Distributions of R2, S2, S2∆ and S
2
a, based on
3 digit sectors estimates. Note: the shaded violins refer to S2∆ and S
2
a.
Labour Productivity TFP
3-DIGIT 4-DIGIT 3-DIGIT 4-DIGIT
Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%) Mean (%) Median (%)
R2 52.95 52.81 55.22 54.91 55.69 55.18 57.92 56.98
S2 14.93 14.36 15.41 14.95 16.75 16.60 16.85 16.63
S2∆ 13.53 12.79 13.82 13.26 15.61 15.34 15.57 15.38
S2a 1.40 1.38 1.59 1.39 1.14 1.08 1.28 1.09
Table 1: Mean and median values of the distributions of R2, S2, S2∆ and S
2
a across 161 3-digit sectors and 393 4-digit
sectors respectively.
on TFP itself, discussed in Dosi and Grazzi (2006), and more specifically on China in Yu et al.
(2015)).18
It is well known that the ownership and governance structures of firms matter in terms of the
different corporate growth patterns, and this is particularly true for the case of China (Guariglia
et al., 2011). To study how different ownership structures affect the magnitudes of the explanatory
power of productivity differentials, we replicate the exercise above after splitting firms within the
same 3-digit sector according to the six ownership types (Table 2 and Figure 5). The values of S2
of “Shareholding” (State-private joint ventures) and domestic private-owned firms are significantly
18The details of total factor productivity measure are shown in the Appendix Appendix B.
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Explanatory power of productivity for growth
Mean Median
Ownership Number of sectors S2 (%) S2∆ S
2
a S
2 (%) S2∆ S
2
a
State-owned 112 14.10 11.76 2.34 13.63 11.31 1.92
Collective-owned 127 16.83 14.50 2.33 15.59 13.93 2.08
HMT-invested 113 12.76 11.44 1.33 12.61 10.83 1.04
Foreign-invested 122 12.54 11.39 1.16 12.40 11.01 0.92
Shareholding 128 14.83 12.93 1.89 14.78 12.69 1.72
Private-owned 148 17.72 16.28 1.44 17.04 15.40 1.24
All types 750 14.95 13.21 1.74 14.44 12.80 1.42
Table 2: Productivity - Growth relationship. Mean and median S2 and decomposition of S2 (S2∆ and S
2
a) by important
ownership types (sectors with the number of firms for each ownership category greater than 200, only). Source: our
elaboration on CMM.
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Figure 5: Productivity - Growth relationship. Distributions (left) of S2 and decomposition (right) of S2 (S2∆ and S
2
a)
by important ownership types. The shaded violins refer to S2a and the un-shaded violins refer to S
2
∆, as shown in the
figure on the right side.
higher than that of the others. Conversely, State-owned and foreign-invested enterprises have
significantly lower S2, based on ANOVA and post hoc Tukey pairwise comparisons. That is, the
selective power of market competition based on firms’ relative efficiency is comparatively stronger
in private and mixed ownership types, but is weaker among SOEs and foreign-invested firms.
Finally, we also investigated whether different “regimes” of technological learning, as captured by
the Pavitt taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984), entails differences in the strength of the productivity-growth
relation. Results do not support much such hypothesis and are not shown here.
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In the light of the statistical regularities in the coefficients for the current and lagged productiv-
ities, one may conjecture that more important drivers of firms growth are productivity variations
over time rather than the relative levels of productivity at any time period, as also found in Dosi
et al. (2015). In order to test the conjecture, we decompose the S2 of productivity into two com-
ponents, associated respectively with levels and variations, and rewrite Equation (2) as
gi,t = α+ β∆∆pii,t + βmp¯ii,t + γ1SIZEi,t−1 + γ2AGEi,t−1 + bt + ui + i,t (5)
where ∆pii,t is the growth rate of productivity of firm i (∆pii,t = pii,t − pii,t−1), which accounts
for the growth of productivity, and p¯ii,t is the within-firm average productivity level over t and t−1
(p¯ii,t =
1
2(pii,t+pii,t−1)), capturing productivity levels.
19 If firms are selected and grow mostly driven
by their relative productivity-level, the explanatory power of p¯ii,t should be greater than that of
∆pii,t, and conversely if the dominant impact is of the rates of change. The estimates continue
to be based on a Correlated Random Effects model.20 The shaded violins in Figure 4 display the
distributions of S2∆pii,t and S
2
p¯ii,t and highlight how the variation of productivity (S
2
∆pii,t
) accounts
for the largest proportion of S2: the competitive selection mechanism across firms within any
one industry appear to be driven to a greater extent by productivity changes rather than relative
productivity levels. Note also that this applies to all ownership types, as shown in Figure 5.
To complete the analysis of the virtuous circle we also investigate the relationship between
productivities and profitabilities. The results show that the explanatory power of productivity-
related variables to profitabilities is over 20% (see Figure C.6). The full set of results is reported
in Appendix Appendix C.
5. Profitability and investment
Let us next investigate the impact of firms’ profitability upon growth. Figure 6 shows the
relationship between profitability and growth by means of a simple kernel regression. Notice that
the kernel fit is flatter than in Figure 2, suggesting that the direct relation between profitability
and growth, in any, is much weaker than that found for productivity. This is confirmed by more
19Hence, β0 =
βm
2
+ β∆ and β1 =
βm
2
− β∆.
20Sectoral (3-digit) results of the decomposition of S2 are available upon request.
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Figure 6: Profitability (gross profit margins) - Growth relationship in selected 3-digit sectors (textile and clothing,
automobiles and communication equipment) - kernel regression of 2003. Note: the first row shows current relationship
and the second row shows lagged relationship. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
rigorous parametric analysis. To allow for comparability of results we employ the same model as
Equation (1). The coefficients of current and lagged profitabilities are statistically significant for
the majority of 3-digit sectors21 as shown in Figure 7. However, no strong statistical regularity
concerning the signs and values of the coefficients emerges. The median of the overall “fitness”
of the model is 46.83%, while the explanatory power (S2) of profitability variables on growth is
1.93% (median), as shown in Figure 8. Therefore, firms’ unobserved idiosyncratic features appear
to explain most of the variance in the (very weak) profitability-growth relationship.
We distinguish firms in each 3-digit sectors by six ownership types and estimate S2 for each
subsample. The mean and median values of S2 are reported in Table 3 and the distributions are
shown in Figure 9. Note that, the median S2 is very small for all types of firms.
Profitability appears to explain a modest 5% or less of the variance of growth rates of sales,
21In the interest of space, detailed tables with sectoral estimates and the related decompositions are not reported
here but are available upon request
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Figure 7: Profitability (gross profit margins) - Growth relationship. Distribution of parameters β0, β1 and β0 + β1 of
the baseline model, based on 3 digit sectors estimates.
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
R2 S2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
Gross profit margins − Growth (3−digit)
Figure 8: Profitability (gross profit margins) - Growth relationship. Distribution of R2 and S2, based on 3 digit
sectors estimates. R2 mean 47.37, median 46.83; S2 mean 2.62, median 1.93 across 161 3-digit sectors.
which, to recall, is much smaller compared to the 15% of productivity. Hence we ought to investigate
a possible missing link between profitability and growth through the indirect channel of investment
in tangible assets, which in turn would spur firm growth.
To our knowledge there does not exist to date a thorough investigation of the investment
19
Explanatory power of profitability (gross profit margins) for growth
Ownership Number of sectors S2-mean (%) S2-median (%)
State-owned 112 6.95 4.81
Collective-owned 127 3.71 2.07
HMT-invested 113 3.00 2.06
Foreign-invested 122 2.63 2.14
Shareholding 128 3.48 2.25
Private-owned 148 2.04 1.44
All types 750 3.54 2.24
Table 3: Profitability (gross profit margins) - Growth relationship. Mean and median S2 by important ownership
types (sectors with the number of firms for each ownership category greater than 200, only). Source: our elaboration
on CMM.
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Figure 9: Profitability (gross profit margins) - Growth relationship. Distributions of S2 by important ownership
types.
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Figure 10: Left: the histogram of investment rates in 1999, 2003 and 2007. Right: the average and median investment
shares by rank over the firms in balanced panel (firms existing over the whole period 1998 - 2007). Source: our
elaboration on CMM.
patterns in China employing firm level data. Hence we start by looking at the statistical properties
of proxies for that variable.
Figure 10 shows the distributions of investment rates, for selected years. For the majority of
firms the yearly investment rate is very low, indeed as everywhere in the world: for example, in
1999, over 70% of firms reported an investment rate of 10% or lower; 9% of firms displayed an
investment rate of 50% or more. These patterns are also quite stable over time: in 2007, 60% of
firms reported an investment rate of 10% or lower; 15% of firms displayed an investment rate of
50% or more. Inactivity (zero investment) also occurs quite often: about 33.7% of the investment
observations are zeros.
Figure 10 also displays our (admittedly noisy) proxy for firms’ investment over time. If we
were to observe that, on average, the profile of annual firm-level investment were rather flat, that
would corroborate the conjecture of a smooth process of capital adjustment at the firm level. The
opposite is true if we were to observe spikes in such firm level patterns. For each firm, we rank the
investment shares for the period 1998-2007 and then we compute the average (median) for each
rank over all the firms in the balanced panel. The highest investment share on average accounts
21
All 1 0 All 1 0 All 1 0 All 1 0
1999 2003 2007 99-07
Mean invest. rate 0.16 0.81 0.04 0.22 0.96 0.06 0.24 1.03 0.08 0.22 0.98 0.07
Median invest. rate 0.01 0.59 0.00 0.03 0.75 0.01 0.05 0.83 0.02 0.03 0.77 0.01
% of spikes in # of obs. 15.80 17.20 17.29 17.06
% of total invest. 66.06 68.83 66.99 67.21
accounted by spikes
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of investment spikes (kernel rule). Note: Si,t = 1 denotes the subsample of investment
spikes, and Si,t = 0 denotes the subsample of non-spike observations. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
for 50% of total investment during the nine years.22 Firms concentrate 80% of investment in three
years, while investment shares are significantly lower in other years, revealing a major lumpiness
of the investment behavior. This confirms, of course, previous results on the dynamics of firms
investments (see among the others Doms and Dunne, 1998)).
Hence, in the following we will focus on investment spikes (see also Power, 1998; Nilsen et al.,
2009), because only very large investments episodes are likely to be accompanied by the expansion
of production capacity, which, in turn, is closely linked to firm growth. As a result, only investment
rate above a certain threshold will be classified as spikes. There are some criteria that guide the
choice among different spike measures. As put forth in Nilsen et al. (2009) the investment must be
large both respect to the history of the firm and to the cross section at averages of the industry.
Further, it has to be a relatively rare event. Overall the definition of the spike must be able to
account for a relevant share of total industry investment.23
In this work, we employ a non parametric methodology that, in order to identify firm level
spikes, resort to the kernel estimate of the relation between investment and capital stock (Grazzi
et al., forthcoming). Details are reported in the Appendix D. Descriptive statistics for kernel
method are reported in Table 4: over the whole sample period, 17% of observations are classified
as spikes and they account for 67% of total investment. Table 5 and 6 show how investment spikes
and investment shares are distributed across ownership classes and how such shares change over
22Investment is deflated by price index.
23Nilsen et al. (2009) also hint at the necessity to account for the relationship that might exist between the
investment rate and the capital stock. According to NBSC, the book value is the sum of nominal values for different
years. We calculate the real capital stock using the perpetual inventory method, assuming a depreciation rate of 9%
and deflate it.
22
Ownership 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 All period
State-owned 17.47 14.10 10.81 6.97 4.98 3.27 2.03 1.80 1.45 5.39
Collective-owned 38.77 33.89 26.05 20.79 15.46 9.13 7.02 5.54 4.53 14.25
HMT-invested 11.11 12.36 12.98 11.85 11.02 11.87 9.91 9.79 9.23 10.71
Foreign-invested 8.25 9.15 10.71 9.63 10.32 13.10 11.86 11.48 10.75 10.80
Shareholding 10.86 12.92 15.64 17.48 17.99 18.95 17.37 17.42 16.60 16.51
Private-invested 12.69 16.71 22.98 32.60 39.69 43.35 51.27 53.57 57.05 41.78
Other domestic 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.68 0.53 0.32 0.55 0.41 0.40 0.55
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 5: Distribution of investment spikes by ownership types. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
Ownership 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 All period
State-owned 51.50 41.16 30.35 22.08 21.36 13.13 16.88 13.51 12.77 20.58
Collective-owned 12.53 12.45 9.31 9.14 8.28 3.99 3.51 3.21 2.97 5.78
HMT-invested 9.52 10.71 9.97 11.92 10.13 11.41 9.63 10.91 10.51 10.50
Foreign-invested 10.23 13.52 14.81 13.98 15.95 20.95 19.83 20.96 21.30 18.29
Shareholding 12.87 17.13 29.22 32.00 30.16 35.22 31.92 30.65 29.49 29.03
Private-owned 2.96 4.60 5.84 10.51 13.88 15.10 17.78 20.59 22.66 15.50
Other domestic 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.37 0.25 0.19 0.45 0.17 0.32 0.33
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 6: Distribution of investment shares by ownership types. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
time. In 1999 around 17.5% of relevant investment episodes were classified as investment spikes
of State-owned enterprises and such events accounted for around half of total investment.24 The
decline over time of State-owned enterprises is well accounted by their shrinking share of both
investment spikes and total investment. On the contrary, private-owned enterprises display the
opposite trend, accounting for an increasing proportion of both spikes and investment shares.
We next turn to investigate how firm’s profitability impact the investment patterns. Conditional
on firm’s past investment behavior and on average investment behavior over the sample, what is
the role of current and past profitabilities in shaping the capital adjustment patterns? The baseline
model for estimating the relationship between profitability and investment employs autoregressive
distributed-lags of length m
yi,t = α+
S∑
s=1
βsyi,t−s +
K∑
k=0
γkxi,t−k + bt + cj + ui + i,t (6)
where yi,t denotes investment rate of firm i at time t; yi,t−s represents investment rate at time
24Due to the large size of State-owned enterprises, a few large investment episodes of this category of firms accounts
for a much larger share of total investment.
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t− s; xi,t−k denotes profitability at time t− k; ui is a correlated firm effect; bt are year dummies;
cj are 2-digit sector dummies, and i,t is a serially uncorrelated disturbance. Since our variable of
interest is the investment spike SPIKEi,t, that takes value 1 if there is a spike and 0 otherwise,
we estimate the refinement upon our baseline model
SPIKEi,t = α+β0Pi,t+β1Pi,t−1+β2Pi,t−2+β3Pi,t−3+γ1Di,−1+γ2Di,−2+γ3Di,−3+bt+cj+ui+i,t
(7)
where Pi,t, Pi,t−1, Pi,t−2 and Pi,t−3 are contemporaneous and lagged profitabilities and Di,−1,
Di,−2 and Di,−3 are duration dummies capturing the time elapsed since last spike. Di,−1 takes value
1 if there is a spike in year t− 1. Di,−2 takes value 1 if there is a spike in year t− 2 but not in t− 1.
Di,−3 is 1 if there is a spike in year t− 3 but not in t− 2 or t− 1. These dummy variables capture
the effect of the length of the interval from the last high-investment episode on the probability of
having a spike in year t (cf. Cooper et al., 1999; Grazzi et al., forthcoming; Bigsten et al., 2005).
ui is a firm-specific unobserved effect and i,t is a serially uncorrelated logistic disturbance term.
Time (year) and sectoral (2-digit) dummies are also included in the regression.25
The effect of profitability on the probability of having a spike in year t is reported in Table
7. The results of random effect logistic regression are reported in the first two columns. The
coefficients of current and lagged profitabilities are jointly significant, suggesting that investment
spikes are sensitive to profitability. As expected, the findings signal that internal and external
sources of finance are not perfectly substitutable. To get an idea of the order of magnitude, a 1%
increase in profitability is related to 1.4% increase in the odds of reporting an investment spike when
considering the sum of the coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged profitabilities.26 Also notice
that the negative effect of past investment spikes on the probability of having current investment
spike decreases with time.
We also estimate the profitability-investment model (Equation (7)) for each ownership type
25After some experimentation and after comparing the AIC and BIC criteria of the models, we decide to include
three lags of profitability.
26The sum of the coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged profitabilities is 1.37, which is the log-odds ratio.
Thus, a 1% increase in profitability will induce e0.01×1.37 − 1 = 0.0138 increase in the odds of having a spike. Odds
refers to the ratio between the probability of having a spike and the probability of not having a spike.
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Figure 11: The estimated coefficients of Equation (8) using random effects logistic regression. Left: the coefficients of
ownership type dummies. Middle: the coefficients of current and lagged profitabilities across ownership types. Right:
the sum of the coefficients of current and lagged profitabilities by ownership types.
respectively. Results show that the magnitudes of the coefficients of profitability differ across
ownership types (see Table 7). In particular it appears that State-owned enterprises is the only
category of firms displaying a non-significant relation between same-year profitability and likelihood
to report an investment spike.
The evidence collected so far has shown that the ownership types influence several characteristics
of the firm, as well as its dynamics. In order to test directly how the effect of profitabilities on
the likelihood of a spike changes across ownership types, we add the related interaction terms as
follows
SPIKEi,t =α+ β0Pi,t + β1Pi,t−1 + β2Pi,t−2 + β3Pi,t−3 + Ji,t
+ δ0(Pi,t × Ji,t) + δ1(Pi,t−1 × Ji,t) + δ2(Pi,t−2 × Ji,t) + δ3(Pi,t−3 × Ji,t)
+ γ1Di,−1 + γ2Di,−2 + γ3Di,−3 + bt + cj + ui + i,t (8)
where Ji,t is the ownership type dummies (i.e., six ownership categories. State-owned enterprises
as the reference group).
Figure 11 summarize the regression results and the comparative evidence across ownership types
on the effects of profitabilities on investment spikes.27 The long-term effects of profitability (the
27The regression results are available upon request.
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sum of the effects of contemporaneous and lagged profitabilities) are the highest for collective-
owned, shareholding and domestic private-owned enterprises.28 In contrast, the large investment
projects of State-owned and foreign-invested enterprises are less sensitive to profitabilities (i.e. cash
flows). Interestingly, even though the large investment projects undertaken by domestic private-
owned enterprises are highly constrained by their profitability, they show the highest propensity to
undertake them.
6. Investment spike and firm growth
Investments in equipment embodying the latest technology is one of the drivers of productivity
growth and plausibly, together, firm growth. In this respect, investment represents a further chan-
nel for the efficiency-driven competitive selection process. Mitigating that, it might also happen
that very large investment episodes are associated with the disruption of consolidated production
processes and existing organizational routines, thus having a (short-term) negative effect on pro-
ductivity before yielding a long learning curve. In particular, the recent empirical evidence (see for
instance Power, 1998) has shown that the occurrence of negative effects following a spike is not a
rare event, especially in the first years following the large investment episode.
To assess the effect of investment spike on firm performance we estimate the model
Xi,t = β0Dt0i,t + β2Dt1i,t + β3Dt2i,t + γ1DBeforei,t + bt + cj + ui + i,t (9)
where Xi,t is one of the three performance variables under our investigation (productivity
level/growth or sales growth) and Dt0i,t, Dt1i,t, Dt2i,t are duration dummies. Dt0i,t takes value 1
if the investment spike is contemporaneous, occurring in year t; Dt1i,t is 1 if the investment took
place at t−1, but not in t, and Dt2i,t takes value 1 if the spike occurred at t−2, but not in t−1 or
in t. DBeforei,t is a dummy taking value one if the last investment spike was observed more than
two years before t and zero otherwise, hence, the coefficient γ1 accounts for the effect of investment
spikes on firm performance in the long run. ui is a firm-specific unobserved random-effect and i,t
is the error term. bt are time dummies and cj are 2-digit sectoral dummies.
28Note that the share of collective-owned enterprises decreased dramatically towards the end of the period of
investigation due to the ownership transformation process (see Yu et al., 2015).
27
In analogy with the previous section, we also include interacted terms so that it is possible to
make direct comparison of the effects of investment spikes on firm performances across different
ownership types, and we estimate the following model
Xi,t =β0Dt0i,t + β1Dt1i,t + β2Dt2i,t + γ1DBeforei,t + Ji,t
+ δ0(Dt0i,t × Ji,t) + δ1(Dt1i,t × Ji,t) + δ2(Dt2i,t × Ji,t) + (δ3DBeforei,t × Ji,t)
+ bt + cj + ui + i,t (10)
where Ji,t denotes the ownership type dummies.
Table 8 reports the estimates of the effects of investment spikes on productivity level. The
contemporaneous investment spike induce a 9.2% increase in productivity level; while an invest-
ment spike occurred more than three years before induce a 3.5% increase in current productivity
level, thus, hinting at a higher impact of contemporaneous spikes. Investments in tangible assets
seem to be able to deploy their effect on productivity since their very adoption. Notice that the
positive effect of investment spikes on productivity levels decreases with the time elapsed from last
investment spike.
To give a preview of whether the effects of investment spikes on productivity level vary across
ownership types, we also test Model (9) for each subsample of firms in terms of their ownership
structures and the last six columns of Table 8 reveal that both the magnitudes and the dynamic
patterns of the effect of investment spikes differ over ownership types.
Based on the fixed effects estimates of Equation (10), Figure 12 shows the effects of investment
on productivity levels conditional on ownership types. A contemporaneous investment spike will
induce a 13-15% increase in productivity level for State-owned and domestic private-owned enter-
prises (even if SOEs and POEs show relatively lower productivity level), while it will not induce
any increase in productivity level for HMT- or foreign-invested firms, and their past investment
spikes might even have negative effects on productivity level (see the graph on the right side of
Figure 12).
The first column of Table 9 shows the effect of investment spikes on growth of sales. The effect
of contemporaneous investment spikes on firm growth is the largest (10.2%) and drops significantly
afterwards. Moreover, a contemporaneous investment spike yields a 14% increase in sales growth
28
Dependent variable: Level of productivity
All manufacturing State-owned Collective-owned HMT-invested Foreign-invested Shareholding Private-owned
D0 0.092 *** 0.082 ** 0.116 *** 0.063 ** 0.055 * 0.092 *** 0.062 ***
(0.008 ) (0.030 ) (0.021 ) (0.021 ) (0.023 ) (0.019 ) (0.015 )
D1 0.083 *** 0.062 0.118 *** 0.040 0.040 0.088 *** 0.055 ***
(0.009 ) (0.034 ) (0.023 ) (0.023 ) (0.024 ) (0.020 ) (0.016 )
D2 0.068 *** 0.054 0.082 ** 0.047 0.042 0.060 ** 0.031
(0.009 ) (0.037 ) (0.025 ) (0.024 ) (0.026 ) (0.021 ) (0.017 )
DBefore 0.035 *** 0.006 0.052 * 0.033 0.002 0.020 0.003
(0.010 ) (0.040 ) (0.027 ) (0.026 ) (0.027 ) (0.023 ) (0.019 )
# Obs. 376653 36759 55806 53711 48903 68412 110454
# Firms 130498 14005 22875 18118 16461 27215 48835
R2 within 0.050 0.040 0.057 0.019 0.019 0.057 0.097
R2 between 0.105 0.044 0.051 0.061 0.020 0.083 0.026
R2 overall 0.063 0.043 0.044 0.049 0.013 0.061 0.027
Table 8: Effects of Investment on levels of productivity. Note: All models are Fixed Effects regressions. Year and
2-digit sectoral dummies are included, 2002 is the reference year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks
denote significance levels (***: p<1%; **: p<5%; * p<10%).
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Figure 12: Left: effects of ownership dummies on productivity level. Note: SOE is the reference group. Right: the
effects of investment spike timing on labour productivity level conditional on ownership types.
compared with only a 8% increase for foreign-invested firms (see Figure 13).
7. Final remarks
The whole virtuous circle driving industrialization and catching-up has many rich microeco-
nomic facets which one is only beginning to explore. This paper contributes to that exploration in
the case of China, an outstanding case of a rapid continent-wide Great Transformation.
Indeed, the major underlying driving force appears to be learning, that is the accumulation
29
Dependent variable: Growth of Sales
All manufacturing State-owned Collective-owned HMT-invested Foreign-invested Shareholding Private-owned
D0 0.102 *** 0.113 *** 0.096 *** 0.094 *** 0.089 *** 0.117 *** 0.090 ***
(0.006 ) (0.025 ) (0.014 ) (0.014 ) (0.013 ) (0.015 ) (0.011 )
D1 0.005 −0.032 0.001 0.008 0.013 0.024 −0.015
(0.006 ) (0.026 ) (0.015 ) (0.014 ) (0.013 ) (0.015 ) (0.011 )
D2 −0.012 * −0.065 * −0.019 −0.009 0.000 −0.006 −0.023
(0.006 ) (0.027 ) (0.016 ) (0.014 ) (0.014 ) (0.016 ) (0.012 )
DBefore −0.010 −0.045 −0.023 0.000 −0.007 0.005 −0.022
(0.006 ) (0.029 ) (0.017 ) (0.016 ) (0.015 ) (0.017 ) (0.013 )
# Obs. 376653 36759 55806 53711 48903 68412 110454
# Firms 130498 14005 22875 18118 16461 27215 48835
R2 within 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.014
R2 between 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006
R2 overall 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.010
Table 9: Effect of Investment on growth of sales. Note: All models are Fixed Effects regression. Column one is the
overall manufacturing and the other columns are subgroups. Year and 2-digit sectoral dummies are included, 2002 is
the reference year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote significance levels (***: p<1%; **:
p<5%; * p<10%).
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Figure 13: The effects of investment spike timing on sales growth conditional on ownership types.
of technological and organizational capabilities yielding imitation, efficiency improvements and,
eventually, innovation (see, in general, Cimoli et al. (2009) and, specifically on China Yu et al.
(2015)). However, the ways such learning translates into corporate growth is somewhat more
indirect and roundabout.
Our analysis reveals a few aspects of the “microeconomics of virtuous circle”. More efficient
firms grow more, but not so much more. Market selection operates in the “right” direction, but
in China as well as in fully industrialized countries, it appears to be relatively mild in its effects.
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That is, in an evolutionary language, (firm-specific) learning appears to be a much more powerful
driver of industrial dynamics than sheer market competition and selection.
This paper contributes to the literature on the market selection mechanism in an emerging
market by exploring the extent to which firm growth rates are shaped by a) relative productivity
levels and productivity variations, and b) profitability-related variables, respectively.
We find that, first, in both mechanisms, firms’ fixed idiosyncratic “strategic orientations” play
a prominent role in explaining the different patterns of firms growth.
Second, we have shown that productivity also greatly contributes to the “explanation” of firm
growth. However it is the growth of productivity that accounts for a substantial portion of overall
variance of firm growth rates, while firm’s relative productivity levels seem to contribute less. As
they argue at much greater length in Dosi et al. (2015), this finding is coherent with a statistical set-
up in which different submarkets are aggregated in the “same” industrial sector. Firms located in
different submarkets do not compete over the same products. Fiat and Volkswagen do not compete
with Ferrari, Jaguar and Lamborghini. But they are all aggregated into the same “sector”. As a
consequence, however, mean productivities do not mean much. Thus, their different absolute levels
of efficiency do not actually matter in explaining their different growth rates. What reveals some
noisy competitive dynamics, on the contrary, is the dynamics on the relative levels of productivity
themselves.
Quite interestingly, our results show that the productivity-growth link is stronger for the most
dynamic firms of the Chinese economy, which often happen to be State-private joint ventures
(shareholding enterprises).
Third, more generally the institutional set-ups matter a lot. They matter in terms of access to
finance. And they matter also in terms of strategic orientations, forms of corporate governance, and
ultimately growth performance. In the Chinese experience, there is some circumstantial evidence
that State-owned enterprises appear to enjoy the softer financial budget constraints. However,
State-private joint ventures turn out to be at the heart of Chinese industrialization in terms of
productivity growth, placement among the most dynamic sectors and output growth.
Fourth, the direct contribution of profitability-related variables to growth is quite small even
if not absent. The positive association between profitability and investment is as such evidence of
the existence of financial constraints and financial market imperfection. In turn, investment spikes
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have a positive and significant effect on firms’ productivity, both in levels and growth rates, and
the effect on sales growth is even bigger.
Taken together these results provide evidence in support of the mediating role of investment
for firm growth, but, more generally, add to the anatomy of the roundabout ways the “virtuous
circle” works. Learning - captured here by the microeconomic dynamics of productivity growth -,
and, relatedly, innovation (we conjecture, in absence of direct proxies) are the perpetual motor of
such virtuous dynamics fuelling and being fuelled by corporate investment and growth.
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Appendix A. Table
Original Dataset Firms with missing, zero, or negative values, manufacturing firms only
Year Total Manuf. Output Value Sales Original Value of Unemployment Wage Welfare Employment
(CIC 13-42) Added Fixed Assets insurance (< 8)
1998 165097 148661 543 12239 5406 4555 102 5 180 4237
1999 162010 146075 6111 10931 6115 4881 134 10 167 5390
2000 162879 147246 5533 9342 5732 4615 94 10 118 4708
2001 171187 155659 4216 7019 4492 3412 61 9 76 3468
2002 181494 165793 4014 7877 4120 3163 53 2 49 3194
2003 196154 181001 2672 5383 2654 2473 4 0 20 2126
2004 279012 258869 5789 20661 5186 4097 1 0 2 5923
2005 271747 250952 1965 6212 1721 1501 25 1 41 1884
2006 301873 278644 2044 5625 2138 2021 39 1 35 2637
2007 336678 312284 1144 4928 1520 1768 28 0 115 1790
Table A.1: Number of observations of the original dataset, number of observations with missing, zero or negative
values for each variable, manufacturing firms only (CIC 13- 42). Note: number of observations with missing and
negative values for unemployment insurance, wage and welfare. Output and value added in year 2004 are not available.
We proxy output as the sum of sales and the difference of inventories between year-end and year-beginning.
Year
Number of
Firms
Output Employee
Value-
added
Sales Capital
Cost of
Labour
Labour
Productiv-
ity
Profitability
L.P.
Growth
Sales
Growth
1998 108223 47702 379 12779 43856 34498 3448 43.7 0.158
1999 125877 48419 348 13139 45273 35837 3358 47.7 0.146 0.070 0.016
2000 125901 56572 338 15126 53907 37857 3702 53.6 0.138 0.060 0.049
2001 138284 58485 307 15685 55608 37917 3493 59.0 0.149 0.046 0.007
2002 149061 63607 292 17378 60680 38058 3596 67.6 0.168 0.082 0.071
2003 162021 75851 285 20396 73911 38967 3849 76.2 0.176 0.099 0.129
2004 211384 76243 236 22132 73185 32746 3539 87.8 0.186 0.046 0.118
2005 238034 89306 242 23825 87461 36577 4181 96.5 0.189 0.154 0.189
2006 265680 100683 233 26838 98991 38317 4614 113.6 0.195 0.170 0.178
2007 248193 130392 245 34565 128225 44916 5880 136.9 0.203 0.176 0.199
Table A.2: Summary statistics (mean) of dataset used in the paper. Source: our elaboration on CMM. Note: output,
value-added, sales, capital and cost of labour are reported at current price, unit: thousands Yuan. Labor productivity
is reported at 1998 constant price, unit: thousands Yuan per employee. Capital denotes the original value of fixed
capital. The value-added of year 2004 is not directly available from the original dataset, thus, we proxy it using “sales
- year beginning inventory + year end inventory + value added tax”.
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Table A.3: Aggregation of the 23 registration categories. The (residual) seventh category is not analyzed separately.
Source: Jefferson et al. (2003), Annex I.
Code Ownership category Code Registration status
1 State-owned 110 State-owned enterprises
141 State-owned jointly operated enterprises
151 Wholly State-owned companies
2 Collective-owned 120 Collective-owned enterprises
130 Shareholding cooperatives
142 Collective jointly operated enterprises
3 Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan-invested 210 Overseas joint ventures
220 Overseas cooperatives
230 Overseas wholly-owned enterprises
240 Overseas shareholding limited companies
4 Foreign-invested
Joint ventures
310 Foreign joint ventures
320 Foreign cooperatives
340 Foreign shareholding limited companies
Foreign MNCs 330 Foreign wholly-owned enterprises
5 Shareholding 159 Other limited liability companies
160 Shareholding limited companies
6 Private 171 Private wholly-owned enterprises
172 Private cooperatives enterprises
173 Private limited liability companies
174 Private shareholding companies
7 Other domestic 143 State-collective jointly operated enterprises
149 Other jointly operated enterprises
190 Other enterprises
Appendix B. Relative TFP and firm growth
The total factor productivity (TFP) is calculated using a non-parametric method, the Tornqvist
index number, as adopted by Solow (1957); Caves et al. (1982); Brandt et al. (2012). This approach
can be interpreted as an exact productivity measure without estimating parameters (Caves et al.,
1982). The intuition is that cost-minimizing firm will equalize the relative factor price to the local
elasticity of substitution that the production technology allows. As a result, factor shares can be
used to control for input substitutability.
To compare the productivity level across firms within the same sector (within 3-digit sectors in
this paper), Caves et al. (1982) propose the multilateral productivity measure:
ln(TFP )i,t = (qi,t − qt)− s˜i,t(li,t − lt)− (1− s˜i,t)(ki,t − kt) (B.1)
where qi,t, li,t and ki,t are the log of (real) value added, labour, and capital of firm i in year
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Figure B.1: Total factor productivity - Growth relationship in selected 3-digit sectors (textile clothing, automobiles
and communication equipment) - kernel regression of 2003. Note: the first row shows current relationship and the
second row shows lagged relationship. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
t; qt, lt and kt are the sectoral averages in year t; s˜i,t = (si,t + st)/2 is the weight on the labour
input. si,t is the share of wage bill in value added of firm i in year t and st is the average wage
share of all firms in the same sector in year t. It represents a comparison with the hypothetical
average firm in the industry. This measure does allow for a comparison with the same benchmark
while maintaining technology heterogeneity, i.e., the input weights differ across observations.
The non-parametric relationship between sales growth and current or lagged one TFP is shown
in Figure B.1, revealing a positive but mile relationship between contemporaneous TFP and relative
growth rates.
The distributions of the parameter estimates of the fixed effects model across 161 3-digit sectors
reveals regularities similar to those using labour productivity measure (shown in Figure B.2), that
the coefficients of current and lagged TFP are similar in absolute magnitudes, but have opposite
signs. The explanatory power of TFP variables to sales growth is around 18%, and the majority
of the explanatory power of TFP is ca[tired by TFP changes, as shown in Figure B.3.
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Figure B.2: Total factor productivity - Growth relationship at 3-digit and 4-digit sectoral level respectively. Distri-
bution of parameters β0, β1 and β0 + β1 of the baseline model.
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Figure B.3: Total factor productivity - Growth relationship. Distribution of R2 and S2.
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Appendix C. Relative productivities and relative profitabilities
The non-parametric kernel regression between profitability and current or lagged one produc-
tivities reveal a robust positive relationship (see in Figure C.4).
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Figure C.4: Productivity - Profitability (gross profit margins) relationship in selected 3-digit sectors (textile clothing,
automobiles and communication equipment) - kernel regression of 2003. Note: the first row shows current relationship
and the second row shows lagged relationship. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
Adopting similar estimation methodologies as in Section 4, we estimate the effects of contempo-
raneous and one-lag productivities on profitability for each 3-digit sector, using fixed-effects model.
The distributions of fixed-effects coefficients are shown in Figure C.5. Firms contemporaneous
productivity shows a significant and positive effect on relative profitabilities.
The explanatory power of productivity-related variables to profitabilities is over 20% (see Fig-
ure C.6) and it is mostly due to productivity levels rather than variations. Notice that, the distri-
butions of S2, S2∆ and S
2
a show some bi-modality, i.e., the probability density is highest at around
10% and 30% in the distribution of S2. This property of bi-modality can be interpreted by the large
variations of the explanatory powers of productivities between State-owned enterprises and other
ownership types (as shown in Figure C.7). The S2s of State-owned enterprises are distributed over
a wide support, the median of the distribution is 25% and that is significantly lower than the S2 of
41
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
β0 β1 β0+β1
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5 Productivity − Gross profit margins (3−digit)
Figure C.5: Productivity - Profitability (gross profit margins) relationship at 3-digit sectoral level. Distribution of
parameters β0, β1 and β0 + β1 of the baseline model.
the other ownership types (around 40%). Conversely, the S2 of foreign-invested and HMT-invested
are the largest.
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Figure C.7: Productivity - Profitability (gross profit margins) relationship. Distributions (left) of S2 and decompo-
sition (right) of S2(S2∆pii,t and S
2
p¯ii,t) by ownership types. The shaded violins refer to S
2
a and the un-shaded violins
refer to S2∆pii,t .
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Appendix D. Investment spikes definition
In the literature, there are four methods of identifying investment spikes, (i) absolute method:
investment rate greater than 20% (the volatility of these ratio decreases with the capital stock,
spikes are much common for small than for large firms); (ii) relative method; (iii) linear method
and (iv) kernel method, which are summarized and compared by Grazzi et al. (forthcoming). In
this paper, we adopt kernel method to identify the investment spikes:
Si,t =
 1 if It/Ki,t−1 > αE[(Ii,t/Ki,t−1)|Ki,t−1]0 otherwise
where α is set to 1.75 and the conditional expected value is obtained through kernel estimation
within each 2-digit sector. For example, the threshold calculated by kernel regression for the overall
sample is shown in Figure D.8. Investment rates above the threshold are defined as investment
spikes.29
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Figure D.8: Kernel regression (curve), binned relation (50 equal spaced bin; dots) and OLS regression (cross mark)
of investment rates on (lag1) ln(capital), communication equipment computers manufacturing sector, in 1999 and
2007. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
29In the data, 3% of firms have investment rate greater than 3. Thus, we delete firms with investment rate greater
than 3 for at least one year.
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